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Macron Reelected — Now What?

Translated and edited by Jon Andrea

On April 10 and 24, France held its presidential elections. As per the Fifth Republic’s Constitution, elections are held in two rounds every five years. The second round only takes place if no candidate obtains an absolute majority of votes during the first, typically allowing for the two candidates with most votes from the first round to face off. While, unlike in the States, French presidential terms last five years, the office of the president is similarly the highest office in France and constitutes the French army’s Commander-in-Chief.

As with the 2017 elections, the second round of votes pitted Emmanuel Macron against Marine Le Pen. It was a standoff that polls and media had long prepared for between a right-wing president — even if he refuses to present himself as such, preferring to call himself “progressive” — and his rival on the far-right — even if she rejects the term, and if her campaign focused on social questions like purchasing power.  

Again, like in 2017, the first round of votes eliminated everyone who is considered left-wing in French politics, and the bourgeois candidate, Macron, was reelected.

Macron’s First Term

Macron’s presidency has never been that of the rich; after all, the rich people’s president was already Nicolas Sarkozy. Rather, Macron’s presidency has benefitted the super-rich. Notably, the first measure passed was the replacement of the “Solidarity Tax on Wealth” with a flat tax, i.e., the “Single Lump-Sum Payment.” Where the former was a system of progressive taxation of assets exceeding 1.3 million euros, the latter taxes capital returns uniformly at 12.8%. The Solidarity Tax’s rate for the lowest echelon was 14%. Such handouts to the wealthy have become characteristic of the Macron era.

Moreover, Marcon has also presided over the violent targeting of the most oppressed workers. In particular, Macron has been steadily chipping away at France’s Labor Code since he was François Hollande’s Finance Minister. He has viciously attacked retirement benefits, which resulted in a large social movement in the winter of 2019-2020. Macron also slashed unemployment benefits at the end of 2021. Meanwhile, during his devastating five-year service, the Minister of National Education Jean-Michel Blanquer has put in place a school system that generates ever-increasing social segregation. He has increased his personnel’s workload at all levels, dismantled measures aimed at decreasing historic and ongoing inequalities in education, and attacked our equivalent of the CORE curriculum. As for immigration, Macron’s “progressivism” has meant nothing but police violence against undocumented migrants and a “tougher” policy of deportation against these travelling workers, the most vulnerable members of the working class.

It was always clear that Macron would support the rich in social struggles, which became all the more clear on November 17th, 2018, when a vast social movement arose. The uprising of the Gilets Jaunes, or “Yellow Vests,” swept through the country for a number of months, occupying roundabouts and other transit hubs and staging more or less spontaneous protests. The Gilets Jaunes mobilized disparate parts of the proletariat, oftentimes those that are situated the most precariously and those that are largely non-unionized and politically unstructured. The revolt, which was triggered by a legislated rise in the price of gasoline, was quickly politicized by the left. They integrated social demands such as the reinstitution of the Solidarity Tax, and democratic ones, such as the “Referendum of Citizens’ Initiative,” a tool for direct democracy. Granted, their unorganized nature and lack of revolutionary leadership made it impossible to draw up programmatic demands beyond these broad points of agreement. Ultimately, a lack of strategic perspectives and ferocious repression foiled the movement and contributed in a large part to diminishing numbers of protesters. Police brutality was widespread, no matter how much the ruling classes and their media deny it. This time saw suspicious deaths — despite the government’s refusal to accept responsibility and an obstructionist bureaucracy (See, for instance, the death of the 80-odd year old Zineb Redouane on December 2nd, 2018, who was killed by a tear gas canister being thrown at her face as she stood by a window in her own apartment just outside a Yellow Vest protest in Marseilles). Some thirty people had their eyes gouged out by rubber-coated bullets, or else suffered serious amputations of their feet and hands. There were also mass arrests, and as a result, hundreds faced imprisonment.

Then, the pandemic arrived. Just as the social uprising against the attacks on retirement were burning out — smothered by union leaderships’ policies — Macron found himself in charge of managing a health crisis, which he did less than brilliantly. Of course, he had to fight against repeated, dangerous lies: that masks did not work or that children were not contagious. However, we must not forget his paternalistic, authoritarian approach to containment; his pro-business policies; the chaos in educational facilities; the overflow of hospitals; and his continued destruction of public health programs like reducing the number of hospital beds.

Macron’s neoliberalism is thus characterized by its authoritarianism. This was evident in the renewed police brutality not only against the Gilets Jaunes. For example, union protesters were also attacked when they campaigned against the President’s retirement “reforms.” Macron relies upon the State of Emergency’s exceptional measures, which use the health crisis as pretext. The police believe themselves to be above the law, and Macron and his Minister of the Interior Gérald Darmanin encourage this attitude. The grim so-called “Law of Total Security” initially sought to outlaw the filming of police operations. Mass protests in 2020 forced them to abandon this outrage. The law that was ultimately passed on May 25, 2021, did not even mention filming the police; it did, however, attack basic freedoms in regard to: municipal police, private security firms, surveillance apparatuses (pedestrian cameras, video surveillance, etc), and the protection of the forces of “law and order.” Meanwhile, the law passed later that year on August 24, “Against Separatism,” infringes upon public freedoms of religion, association, and education under the pretense of fighting political Islam.

In terms of the environment and the struggle against global warming, Macron’s record is a complete failure. His work has amounted only to posturing and “progressive” greenwashing. As a result, the media announced the departure of the only Minister of the Environment who wanted to believe in the President’s good intentions, Nicolas Hulot, after one year and three months. As for the 150 people randomly chosen to constitute the Citizens’ Convention on Climate (in November 2019), their work was largely buried. The executive branch rejected around 90% of their proposals, and the citizens’ referendum that Macron promised to hold on the ecological disaster never took place. The President’s collaboration with the French oil and gas giant TotalEnergies, notably for their operations in Uganda, clearly demonstrates the hypocrisy and irresponsibility that characterize his policies. Furthermore, the French State has twice been condemned for inaction in fighting ecological disaster by the administrative tribunal of Paris, a decision that NGOs then echoed.

Without even discussing the affairs and scandals often swept under the rug that have proliferated over these past five years, nor the growing mediocrity of political figures and their consequently revealed entanglement with the business world — it is evident that given such a record, a large part of the electorate, especially among the lower classes, would never vote for Macron under any circumstances.

First Round Candidates

As in America, French political life is regulated by electoral politics; that is to say, there are few autonomous workers’ movements. As a result, elections provide valuable insight not into the political system as a whole but into its decay. A brief overview of the recent elections will demonstrate both the increasing lack of faith in the status quo and the absence of a viable revolutionary leadership.

For the majority of the Fifth Republic’s presidential elections, the second round of voting has pitted two kinds of candidates against each other that have formed two opposing political blocs. There are, on the one hand, the classic, traditional right, “republicans.” On the other, is the social-democratic “left wing.” They represent the reformist left, even if they propose fewer and fewer reforms and more and more counter-reforms. However, it seems that this pattern has changed irrevocably. Progressively, however, a third bloc has arisen and then developed: the far-right, in the form of the National Front party, now called “National Rally.” Obviously, one of these three blocs must be weeded out in anticipation for the second round. Therefore, the degree to which elections can even claim to represent the people’s views is lessened, and thus, their legitimacy.

In 2017 and 2022, Jean-Luc Mélenchon was the most popular left-wing candidate. Albeit with its own characteristics, Mélenchon’s party, Unsubmissive France, represents a French neo-reformist current seen around the world: in Greece with Syriza, in Portugal with the Bloco de Esquerda, in Spain with Podemos, etc. The party seeks institutional and electoral solutions to change the political landscape, including instituting a Sixth Republic. Unsubmissive France gathered a vast swath of the left in a group entitled Popular Union. Their program, “The Future, Together,” announces a series of desired progressive economic and social reforms: policies that favor public services, guaranteed minimum income, a minimum wage increase to 1,400 euro per month, the return of the age of retirement to 60, ecological planning, etc. However, all of that is meant to be achieved without a major confrontation with the bourgeoisie and without any expropriation. For a long while, polls only had Mélenchon as likely to win 8 to 10% of the vote. Although he obtained around 15% in the final days before the first round, he was still far behind Macron and Marine Le Pen.

Another Macron-Le Pen Stand-Off, Won By the President

Throughout the weeks that preceded the first round, Macron did not hesitate to make severe blows to social safety nets central to his campaign. He highlighted two deeply unpopular measures in particular. Firstly, he wanted to raise the age of retirement to 65, under the pretext of aligning France’s policies to those of Central Europe. Secondly, he proposed making unemployment benefits accessible only to those who work 15 or 20 hours a week. Behind the flimsy arguments against “handouts” and in favor of “putting France to work” is, of course, the funneling of wealth to the richest few. Macron, assured of his victory by the polls, arrogantly thought he could get away with these two intended policies at the forefront of his campaign. Macron was also trying to win over a conservative, moneyed electorate. However, as the vote approached, opinion polls indicated a tighter race than previously expected, with Macron losing his base and Marine Le Pen gathering strength. The very last polls, while still favoring Macron, were open to the possibility of Le Pen gaining the upper hand. Projections for the second round were even closer. Still, Macron’s lead on Le Pen for the first round (around 1.7 million votes and 4.7 points) turned out to be stronger than predicted. Opinion polls between the two rounds saw a renewed increased gap between the two finalists.

After the first round, most of the eliminated candidates threw their weight behind a specific candidate. However, opinion polls clearly demonstrated a big divide between the eliminated candidates’ exhortations and their supporters’ votes. It became all the more apparent that Mélenchon voters would hold the key for the second round. However, this electorate seemed largely hesitant and divided. They oscillated between abstentions, protest votes, and Macron, with a slim minority going over to Le Pen.

Unsurprisingly, both candidates attempted to woo former Mélenchon voters. Hoping to please them, Le Pen focused on social issues. Macron, meanwhile, was quick to appear “conciliatory,” talking about only raising the age retirement to 64, and of organizing a debate with a referendum on the question. Macron’s cynicism took no time at all to reveal itself: the day after his victory on April 24th, his Minister of the Economy Bruno Le Maire claimed that it was not out of the question to employ Article 49.3 of the Constitution in order to push the intended counter-reforms through parliament without debate. This is one of many insults to those who voted for Macron to block the National Rally.

Ultimately, Macron was reelected largely thanks to left-wing voters, Mélenchon’s in particular, who were worried by the thought of Le Pen in power. Indeed, in non-European France, Mélenchon supporters overwhelmingly turned to Le Pen in order to defeat the President. Ultimately, however, a majority of Popular Union supporters decided to vote for Macron, albeit holding their noses. Indeed, the idea that a vote for Macron would defeat “fascism”— a term incorrectly thrown around, as a separate and much longer article would have to demonstrate — was put front and center from the moderate Right to sectors of the far-left. The fear of National Rally and “fascism” in power once again aided Macron, even if less than it did five years ago. The reelected president referenced this point in his victory speech, the evening of April 24: “A number of our compatriots today voted for me, not because of my ideas but in order to block the far-right.” 

What can the left hope to gain from this election? Can we expect concessions, fewer “tough” policies, fewer slashes to public budgets? Small chance! This is because, contrary to appearances, Macron’s project does not answer to his voters but to the bourgeoisie, who need political power to augment their profits and continue to attack social progress. Certainly, Macron claimed to want to be “President for everyone,” meaning not only his supporters, but also those of Le Pen and Mélenchon. But he said the same sort of thing in 2017, while his policies have been nothing but a continued affront to left-wing voters. Bruno Le Maire’s declarations on retirement, referenced above, indicate that Macron 2.0 will be just as brutal and contemptuous as the original.  

And Now?

There are a few other points to consider in the wake of the recent election. Firstly, as far-left candidate Philippe Poutou sharply observed, Unsubmissive France’s compromises drag their line further and further to the Right, away from radicalism. Establishment politics has already led us to expect this kind of development. This is not Lenin’s democratic centralism, as the far-left New Anti-Capitalist Party attempts to claim, but rather a rallying around the most reformist tendencies of the Popular Union. That said, even if precise studies are lacking, it would appear that the push to centralize is effective, especially amongst the working classes. Many seem to want the various left parties to unite in the hopes of winning more legislative seats and, to a certain extent, undoing the Presidential Elections.

However, this task is mired in confusion. Even if the media refers to Unsubmissive France as “the radical left,” it is important to remember that they are in fact a neo-reformist force in politics. They want to change society — not in any anti-capitalist sense, but rather in the neo-liberal understanding: by way of institutional powers, not revolutionary struggle and insurrection. It is important to remember how this “radical left” has failed miserably around the world: Syriza, Podemos, Bloco de Esquerda, Rifondazione, etc. What these neo-reformist currents all have in common is that they either do not know or do not wish to know what the bourgeois state is and who it serves. Moreover, they forget that the bourgeoisie is willing to do anything to defend its power and privileges, no matter what the cost for the rest of humanity and the planet.

Speaking on the issue of French debt being attacked by international finance, Mélenchon said, “Well, we’ll see.” His interviewer asked more precisely, “How do we fight international finance?” Mélenchon’s response: “We fight, we defend. But I have good weapons.” He added, “I don’t think it’s reasonable for France to be attacked… The results could be disastrous for everyone… I think that people are reasonable. They won’t do anything too stupid. But I do not suggest that anyone attack France if I’m the one in charge!” And that was it. Mélenchon does not want to understand and express that direct conflict with the bourgeoisie and their expropriation in the most important sectors of the economy are absolutely vital.

Growth in Unsubmissive France and its broad left-wing alliance is possible, though it’s too early to predict with any confidence. This new configuration of the left certainly seems to irritate the commentariat who are always keen to protect the bourgeois order. Mediapart, an online journal, has even spoken of a “wave of panic.” The same article reads: “As the possibility of an agreement that could unite the left and the environmentalists before the legislative elections on the 12 and 19 of June grows more and more concrete, the politico-media ‘voice of reason’ draws closer to a nervous breakdown. The political importance of the Mélenchon current since April 10 (winning 22% of the vote) and its potential capacity to strengthen the left do not sit well with zealous defenders of the status quo.” These upholders of the existing order, for whom the developing “radical” left is a thorn in their side, recruit amongst the politicians of the establishment parties, as well as amongst the mediocrity of the media. Their ranks will probably grow if Unsubmissive France’s project develops any further. The political situation will certainly be different depending on whether allies of Macron or Mélenchon win a majority of legislative seats. However, Mélenchon’s victory is far from likely, and if it were to happen, a political and maybe even social storm would be sure to ensue.

Workers must have some significant worries about the situation described above. What the Popular Union proposes is not a dictatorship of the proletariat, but merely an electoral coalition of “the left” embedded in the establishment, which includes forces that have in the past shown their willingness to betray working. It is indeed a revolution that we need to prepare for, and for that, a revolutionary party is necessary. Unfortunately, the French left is clearly lacking. Between the New Anti-Capitalist Party that allows itself to be bogged down by Unsubmissive France and Workers’ Struggle, which stands its ground better but offers no concrete proposals, there is no political alternative capable of posing a real class analysis of the struggles that are underway, nor of facing up to the disillusionment that is just around the corner.

This piece was initially published at the Liga Internacional dos Trabalhadores— Quarta Internacional (https://litci.org/fr/macron-reelu-et-maintenant/).

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